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1. Introduction
One of the main insights in the theory of general equilibrium is the so-called Edgeworth’s conjecture. It aﬃrms that if
an economy has suﬃciently many traders, than each individual agent has no inﬂuence on the market, but only coalitions
do have inﬂuence on the outcome of economic exchange. Consequently, allocations of resources produced by coalitional
barter processes (without regard to prices) would coincide with equilibrium allocations resulting from competitive market
mechanisms. The conjecture has been conﬁrmed in the literature by the formal equivalence between the core of a large
economy and the set of Walrasian competitive allocations (core-Walras equivalence theorem). The traditional framework
to describe large economies is the individual nonatomic description of an economy pioneered by Aumann, in which the
measure space of agents is formalized by the real unit interval with its Lebesgue measure. In this context, when an allocation
of resources deﬁned on the set of agents is integrated with respect to the Lebesgue measure, then the change of the
allocation at a single individual agent does not change the total amount of resources.
The aim of this paper is to show the equivalence between the core and the set of Walrasian competitive allocations for
production economies with a measure space of agents. The main features of the model adopted in this paper to which we
should like to call attention are:
1. the coalitional representation of the economy;
2. the inﬁnite number of commodities.
The coalitional representation of economic models goes back to [24]. In this paper, individual agents disappear and
attention is focused on coalitions, providing a core equivalence theorem in this new framework. The key idea is to replace
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being characterized by a preference relation and an initial endowment.
Subsequently, in [4] the core-Walras equivalence is studied in coalitional models assuming only ﬁnite additivity of mea-
sures, that is exactly the approach treated in this paper.
By taking the coalitional approach as a model of competitive markets, allocations are deﬁned as ﬁnitely additive measures
on a Boolean algebra of coalitions rather than σ -additive measures on a Boolean σ -algebra. The step from the individual
to the coalitional representation and the one from countable to ﬁnite additivity has been motivated in the literature by
substantial economic and technical reasons (see [4,24]). We just notice that from the point of view of economic realism, to
build a theory with coalitions as primitive “actors” looks very natural given that in competitive markets only coalitions have
economic weight. Moreover, since the use of atomless countable additive measures implies that the population of agents
has to be more than countable, the ﬁnitely additive approach allows to include models of nonatomic exchange economies
with a countable set of agents such as the integers. The convenience of the ﬁnitely additive coalitional approach is also
supported in [4] by means of models involving uncountable population with no σ -additive measures.
For what concerns the comprehensiveness of the coalitional setting with respect to the individual one, the Aumann’s
nonatomic description of an economy can be included within the coalitional one by means of standard integration pro-
cedure (see [4,13]). The converse is also true for ﬁnite-dimensional commodity spaces and for those inﬁnite-dimensional
commodity spaces having the Radon–Nikodym property (see [14]). However, the coalitional description may provide added
generality since it does not necessarily presumes an individual representation. Precisely, the coalitional representation of an
economy can be given without regard to the individual representation, for example in those spaces which do not exhibit
the Radon–Nikodym theorem. In this sense, a coalitional representation can be considered as a more general way of de-
scribing an economy. This possibility brings out a further advantage of the coalitional framework when dealing with models
involving uncertainty and private information. Indeed, it allows to deﬁne the private information of coalitions without any
regard to individual contributions, leading to notions of core overcoming well-known criticisms related to mechanism of
information sharing among individual traders (see [8]).
The “informationally constrained” consumption sets of asymmetric information economies suggested us to consider in
this paper coalition production economies in which coalitions have consumption sets different from the positive cone. We
build a model that does not preclude a priori economies where information matters and situations in which the consump-
tion sets are smaller than the positive cone. We formalize production by means of a correspondence which is rich in suitable
selections (see also [7]). We derive a simple comprehensive core-equivalence result (Theorem 3.3) whose strategy proof is
based on the (weak) Lyapunov theorem for ﬁnitely additive measures and free disposal arguments (compare the approach
of [12]). We prove our result also in the case of irreducible economies (Theorem 3.5).
A one more advantage of the coalitional representation over the individual one emerges looking to the second main
feature of our model, the one concerning the case of inﬁnitely many commodities (Section 4). Inﬁnitely many commodities
naturally arise in economic models with inﬁnite horizon, with uncertainty, with commodity differentiation. In such cases,
the coalitional representation allows us to derive core-equivalence results under relatively mild assumptions with respect to
the corresponding individual model, in the sense speciﬁed below.
Looking to the extensions of the Aumann’s classical core-equivalence theorem to inﬁnite-dimensional commodity spaces,
the major difference between the ﬁnite-dimensional and the inﬁnite-dimensional framework is related to the absence in this
last case of interior points in the positive cone. Without the interiority assumption, the existence of separating hyperplanes,
i.e. prices supporting core allocations, becomes problematic. A direction to proceed is to impose additional “cone conditions”
on the underlying parameters of the economy such as “properness assumptions” on preferences (see for example [22]). The
use of cone conditions is naturally binded, from a technical point of view, to the lattice structure of the commodity space [3].
An attempt to introduce cone conditions in ﬁnitely additive coalitional model is present in [12], where equivalence results
are proved without imposing constraints on consumption, but assuming that the consumption set of a coalition is the whole
space. The paper [12] brings out the relevance of functional analytic methods to show the Edgeworth’s conjecture in the
ﬁnitely additive setting, coalitional economies. The coalitional approach, even in a countably additive framework, has also
been found very useful for the treatment of inﬁnite-dimensional commodity spaces in [15,25].
To overcome diﬃculties arising in the inﬁnite-dimensional set up, we impose in this paper a restriction on a coalitional
production set interpreted as a requirement of uniformly bounded marginal rate of substitution. We present a version of
the core-equivalence theorem in the ﬁnitely additive coalitional setting without assuming that the positive cone has a non-
empty interior or cone conditions on coalitional preferences or unconstrained consumption sets. The novelty of our result
relies on the adaptation to the ﬁnitely additive framework of a separation theorem due to Bishop and Phelps joint with
suitable assumptions on the production set correspondence (for a discussion of the applications in economic theory of the
Bishop and Phelps theorem we refer to [20]). Notice also that our equivalence theorem with inﬁnitely many commodities
is proved with reference to an ordered vector space of commodities which need not possesses a lattice structure. For the
limitations of the vector lattice approach and the wider set of applications based on a lattice free analysis, we refer the
redear to [3,2].
We ﬁnally underline that the equivalence results in Section 4 are derived without requiring the separability of the
commodity space. On the contrary, dealing with extentions of Aumann model to the inﬁnitely many commodities, the
core-Walras non-equivalence results in [23,21] show that, in any non-separable Banach space, core-Walras equivalence may
fail although all the “desirable assumptions” on the parameters of the model hold true. Hence, our equivalence theorem
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under weaker conditions.
2. The economic model
We consider a ﬁnitely additive coalition production economy with arbitrary consumption sets.
We assume coalitions rather than individuals as primitive concepts. As in [4], in order to describe the coalitional setting
we can work with a Boolean algebra (A,∨,∧,∗ ,0,1). By Stone’s theorem, every Boolean algebra is isomorphic to a Boolean
algebra of sets. Therefore, we can support our model with the intuition of a population of individual agents, without any
speciﬁc mention in this sense. Agents are represented by the “grand” coalition 1 and may unit forming a coalition F in A.
By means of the three operations ∨, ∧, ∗, ﬁnite unions, ﬁnite intersections and complements of coalitions are coalitions.
Let us use I in state of 1 to denote the grand coalition and the classical set-theoretical operation ∩, ∪ and c instead of ∧,
∨ and ∗.
The economy E is then represented by
E = {(I,A,m),L,M, (F )F∈A, e, Y },
where
• A is the Boolean algebra of all admissible coalitions;
• m is a ﬁnitely additive measure representing, for each coalition F in A, the economic “weight” of the coalition in the
market;
• L is an ordered Banach space whose positive cone L+ represents the commodity space;
• M represents the consumption set correspondence;
• F , for each coalition F , represents the preference relation of the coalition F ;
• e : A → L+ is the initial endowment density;
• Y represents the production set correspondence.
The commodity-price duality is deﬁned by means of a dual system of ordered Banach spaces 〈L,L′〉 placed in duality by the
evaluation 〈x, p〉 = p · x, for any x ∈ L and p ∈ L′ . A generic bundle of goods is represented by a vector x of L+ . The positive
cone of the norm dual of L, L′+ , represents the price space. As usual, the value of the commodity x at price p is given by
the evaluation p · x. An allocation speciﬁes the way to assign a bundle of goods to every coalition. It will be represented by
a ﬁnitely additive function from A to L+ . According to [4], we only consider allocations that are m-absolutely continuous.
We refer to the usual ε–δ deﬁnition of absolutely continuity: given two vector measures μ : A → L and ν : A → L, ν is
said to be absolutely continuous with respect to μ (ν  μ), if ∀ε > 0 ∃δ > 0 s.t. ∀E ∈ A with ‖μ(E)‖ < δ then ‖ν(E)‖ < ε.
In other words
Deﬁnition 2.1. An allocation is an element of the collection
M = {α : A → L+: α is ﬁnitely additive and α m}.
The default in this paper is that measures are only ﬁnitely additive (f.a. for short), unless it is differently written. A par-
ticular allocation is e : A → L+, where e(F ) represents the initial endowment of the coalition F .
To relate the weight of coalitions to the commodities that they can trade on the market, the measure m is assumed
to be equivalent to e. Two ﬁnitely additive measures are said to be equivalent if each of them is absolutely continuous
with respect to the other. Notice that, when in Section 3 the commodity space L will be assumed to be ﬁnite-dimensional,
as L = R and e : A → R+ has  components, it is suﬃcient to require m =
∑
i=1 ei , that is m(F ) =
∑
i=1 ei(F ), for all F
in A.
The idea of market competitiveness, that is there are no agents with non-null weight on trades, is transferred from
individuals to coalitions requiring that
(A.1) the coalitional measure m is nonatomic.
The deﬁnition of nonatomicity we use is usually also referred to as strong continuity (see [10]): A vector measure m
is said to be nonatomic if for every ε > 0 there is a measurable partition {F1, . . . , Fn} of I such that ‖m(F )‖ < ε, for any
F ⊆ Fi , for all i = 1, . . . ,n.
We denote by N the set of all null coalitions, that is the coalitions F such that m(F ) = 0. We remark that, since e and m
are equivalent, a null coalition is a coalition that has null endowment. We require that the initial endowment satisﬁes the
following availability condition
(A.2) e(F )  0 for each F in A \ N
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p ∈ L′+.
For any allocation α and for a coalition F ∈ A, we shall denote by α|F the vector measure deﬁned on the Boolean algebra
A by (α|F )(E) = α(E ∩ F ), for any E ∈ A.
As in [4,7], in order to represent the preferences of each coalition F , a binary relation F is deﬁned on the set M of
allocations. Intuitively, α F β expresses the idea that the members of the coalition F prefer what they get from allocation
α to what they get from allocation β . Following [4], we deﬁne a weak preference for each non-null coalition F as follows.
Given two allocations α and β in M and a non-null coalition F , we say that β F α if, for every non-null subcoalition
E of F , it is not true that α E β. Moreover, as in [13], given two allocations α and β in M, the distance of α and β is





where the supremum is taken over all ﬁnite partitions {Ei} of I made up of elements of A. We remark that F is not
reﬂexive and not necessarily transitive. Coalitional preferences are required to satisfy the properties listed below:
(i) given μ1 and μ2 in M, the set of all coalitions F in A such that μ1 F μ2 forms an ideal of A;
(s) given μ, μ1 and μ2 in M and F in A, if μ1 and μ2 are identical on (A ∩ F ), then F does not distinguish between
them, in other words
μ1 F μ ⇔ μ2 F μ and μ F μ1 ⇔ μ F μ2;
(m) given μ1, μ2 in M and F in A, we have that μ1 F μ2 whenever for all E in (A ∩ F ) \ N , μ1(E)  μ2(E) and
μ1(E) = μ2(E);
(c) the set {(α,β) ∈ M × M: α F β} is closed in M × M in the variation norm topology.
Letters i, s and m are respectively the abbreviations for “ideal”, “selﬁsh” and “monotonic” used in [4,7], while c is the
abbreviation for “(lower semi)continuity” as it is formulated in condition (II) used in [13].
Actually, we shall use in the sequel a weak form of continuity. This is the content of the following condition (c′):
(c′) if β F α, there exists ε ∈ (0,1) and there exists a non-null subcoalition E of F such that εβ E α.
Proposition 2.2. If F satisﬁes (c), then F satisﬁes (c′).
Proof. Let us denote by C the set {(γ , δ) ∈ M × M: γ F δ}. Consider α and β in M and F in A \ N .
Assume that β F α. Then it is not true that α F β, that is (α,β) /∈ C . By assumption (c), C is a closed subset of
M × M. Then, for ε > 0 suﬃciently close to 1, the pair (α, εβ) does not belong to C . It means that α F εβ is not
satisﬁed, that is, by deﬁnition of F , there exists a non-null subcoalition E of F such that εβ E α. 
Deﬁnition 2.3. A correspondence
M : F ∈ A \ N → M(F ) ⊆ L+
is said to be a consumption set correspondence if the following list of properties is satisﬁed:
(i) 0 ∈ M(F ),
(ii) M(F1) + M(F2) ⊆ M(F1 ∪ F2), whenever F1 ∩ F2 = ∅ (superadditivity),
(iii) M(F ) is a closed, convex cone for each F in A \ N .
The set M(F ) represents admissible consumption for the coalition F . Consequently, assumption (i) means that each
coalition has the right to do not consume, while assumption (ii) means that if F1 can consume x1 and F2 can consume x2
then the coalition F1 ∪ F2 can consume x1 + x2. Consumption allocations are then deﬁned as ﬁnitely additive m-continuous
selections of the consumption set correspondence.
Deﬁnition 2.4. An allocation α ∈ M is a consumption allocation if for each non-null coalition F , α(F ) ∈ M(F ).
Obviously, the initial endowment e : A → L+ will be required to be a consumption allocation. Notice also that, since
M(F ) is a convex cone containing zero for each coalition F , then for each consumption allocations α and β and a positive
real number ε, the vector measures εα and α + β are still consumption allocations.
We suppose that every coalition F has a productive capability which we express, following [7], by means of a subset
Y (F ) of L called production possibility set. The points of this set are called production plans. If y is such a point, in the
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precisely, y ∈ Y (F ) means that the coalition F is able to produce y+ = y ∨ 0 if it has at its disposal y− = (−y) ∨ 0.
Deﬁnition 2.5. A correspondence
Y : F ∈ A \ N → Y (F ) ⊆ L
is said to be a production set correspondence if the following list of properties is satisﬁed:
(i) 0 ∈ Y (F ), for each F in A \ N ,
(ii) Y (F1) + Y (F2) ⊆ Y (F1 ∪ F2), whenever F1 ∩ F2 = ∅ (superadditivity).
We remark that assumption (i) means that each coalition has the possibility of inaction, while assumption (ii) means
that a production possibility y1 + y2 is available to the coalition F1 ∪ F2 if each production yi is available separately to the
coalition Fi . We shall assume free disposal by means of the assumption
(A.3) for each coalition F ∈ A \ N , −L+ ⊆ Y (F ).
The ﬁnitely additive m-continuous selections of the production set correspondence will be called production allocations.
Deﬁnition 2.6. A ﬁnitely additive m-continuous vector measure σ : A → L is a production allocation if for each non-null
coalition F , σ(F ) ∈ Y (F ).
Deﬁnition 2.7. An allocation α : A → L+ is an assignment for a coalition F if α(E) ∈ M(E) for each non-null subcoalition E
of F .
We shall denote by M(F ) the subset of M formed by allocations that are assignments for a non-null coalition F .
Deﬁnition 2.8. An assignment α for a coalition F is feasible on F if α(F ) − e(F ) ∈ Y (F ).
Deﬁnition 2.9. A feasible allocation α is a consumption allocation that is feasible on I , that is
(i) α(F ) ∈ M(F ) for each F ∈ A \ N ;
(ii) α(I) − e(I) ∈ Y (I).
For each x belonging to L+ we consider the measure xm deﬁned by the law F → xm(F ). Notice that this m-continuous
vector measure represents a uniform allocation (the endowment-uniform allocation) that is not necessarily a consumption
allocation. This is the case when the vector x is different from 0 and it belongs to
⋂
E∈A\N M(E). Indeed, in this case, by
convexity of consumption sets and property (i) of Deﬁnition 2.3, xm(F ) ∈ M(F ) for each non-null coalition F .
Let us now introduce the two main equilibrium concepts: from a cooperative point of view, the concept of core allocation
and, from the non-cooperative one, the concept of competitive equilibrium allocation.
Deﬁnition 2.10. A consumption allocation α : A → L+ is a core allocation if it is feasible and do not exist F in A and an
assignment γ on F such that
(i) m(F ) > 0,
(ii) γ (F ) − e(F ) ∈ Y (F ),
(iii) γ F α.
We denote by C(E) the set of all core allocations of E .
Deﬁnition 2.11. Let α : A → L+ be a feasible consumption allocation and p in L′+ be a price system. The pair (α, p) is a
Walrasian (or a competitive) equilibrium, and α is a competitive (or a Walrasian) allocation, if it is possible to determine a
production allocation π such that
(i) p · α(F ) p · e(F ) + p · π(F ), for each F in A \ N ,
(ii) p · π(F ) p · Y (F ), for each F ∈ A \ N ,
(iii) when γ is an assignment on F with γ F α, and m(F ) > 0, then
p · γ (F ) − p · e(F ) > p · π(F ).
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(iii)′ when γ is an assignment on F with γ F α, and m(F ) > 0, then
p · γ (F ) − p · e(F ) p · π(F )
the allocation α is a quasi Walrasian allocation.
It is obvious that a Walrasian allocation is also quasi Walrasian. Moreover each Walrasian allocation belongs to the core.
This is the content of the following proposition:
Proposition 2.12. Each Walrasian allocation is a core allocation.
Proof. Let p be the price system corresponding to the Walrasian allocation α. Assume that α does not belong to the core.
There exist a coalition F in A \ N and an assignment β on F such that β F α and β(F ) − e(F ) ∈ Y (F ). Let y in Y (F ) be
such that β(F ) − e(F ) = y. Then
p · (β(F ) − e(F ))= p · y.
But, since (α, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium, by (iii), and (ii),
p · (β(F ) − e(F ))> p · y.
So a contradiction. 
Deﬁnition 2.13. We say that a production set correspondence Y is rich in selection with a given property, if Y is such that
for each F in A \ N and y in Y (F ) a selection σ exists with that property and assuming the value y on F .
In our next results we shall assume that
(A.4) the production set correspondence Y is rich in f.a. m-continuous selection.
It is obvious that under assumption (A.4), the superadditivity implies that the correspondence Y is really f.a.
Remark 2.14. Notice that, in contrast to [16], we do not assume that the production set correspondence has convex values.
We can dispense with the convexity assumption on the production side under the f.a. approach due to assumption (A.4). In
the context of coalition production economies deﬁned by [16], the convexity of values of the production set correspondence
Y is equivalent to require assumption (A.4) (see [5, Theorem 8.2], and observe that the selections of Y , in this case, are really
countably additive). In particular, a close look at the argument of [5, Theorem 8.2] shows that the exact Lyapunov convexity
theorem of countably additive selections ensures that whenever (A.4) is satisﬁed, then Y has convex values. In the ﬁnitely
additive framework, vector measures only have the weak Lyapunov convexity property: The closure of the range is convex,
while the range itself may not be convex. Hence (A.4) does not imply convexity. To construct examples in this direction, it
suﬃces to consider on a f.a. measure space of coalitions (I,A,m) an m-continuous f.a. vector measure μ whose range R(μ)
is not convex. The production set correspondence deﬁned by Y (F ) = R(μ|F ) is f.a. and clearly satisﬁes (A.4), but obviously it
does not have convex values. Therefore, when compared with the countably additive one, our approach shows that, on the
production side, the richness in f.a. m-continuous selection, rather than convexity assumption, is the central hypothesis for
the core equivalence theorem. Of course, even in the f.a. framework, assuming that the production set correspondence has
closed values, a slight modiﬁcation of the argument in [5, Theorem 8.2] proves that, due to the weak Lyapunov convexity
theorem of f.a. selections, assumption (A.4) implies convexity of values. We refer to [7] for a deeper investigation of f.a.
set correspondences and of conditions under which assumption (A.4) is satisﬁed. Assuming that the production set corre-
spondence Y is f.a., it is proved in [7, Theorem 3] that the richness of the production set correspondence in f.a. selections
is guaranteed as soon as such correspondence is closed-valued and nonatomic. Consequently, the ﬁnite-dimensional results
of Section 3 could be equivalently formulated assuming, instead of (A.4), that the production set correspondence Y is f.a.,
closed-valued and m-absolutely continuous.
3. Equivalence results
Our next aim is to show core equivalence theorems under coalitional representation. We start assuming in this section
that the commodity space L is ﬁnite-dimensional.
For a given allocation α belonging to the core, let us deﬁne the set K as the norm closure of all the possible desirable
net trades for the economy, that is




μ(F ),μ ∈ M(F ),μ F α
}− e(F ) − Y (F )]
}
.
Proposition 3.1. Assume that conditions (A.1) and (A.4) are satisﬁed. Then the set K is convex.
Proof. Let x1 and x2 be two elements of K . Fix t1, t2 and ε in (0,1) with t1 + t2 = 1.
By deﬁnition of K , there exist, for each i = 1,2, a coalition Fi in A \ N , an assignment γi in M(Fi) and a production
allocation yi in Y (Fi) such that
γi Fi α
and
∥∥xi − (γi(Fi) − e(Fi) − yi)∥∥< ε.
Since the production set correspondence is rich in selection, we can set σi(Fi) = yi, where σi is an m-absolutely continuous
production allocation.
Let us denote, for each i = 1,2, by βi the vector measure (γi, e, σi). Then, by construction, each βi is a nonatomic
measure. Hence, by Generalized Lyapunov theorem (see [4, Lemma 4]), we can ﬁnd, for each i = 1,2, Ei ∈ (Fi ∩A) \N with
E1 ∩ E2 = ∅ such that
∥∥βi(Ei) − tiβi(Fi)∥∥< ε.
Deﬁne now E = E1 ∪ E2, γ = γ1|E1 + γ2|E2 and σ = σ1|E1 + σ2|E2 .
Since, for each i = 1,2, γi is in M(Fi) and Ei is a subcoalition of Fi, then γ belongs to M(E).
Furthermore, since γ |Ei = γi |Ei and γi Fi α, we have γi |Ei Ei α, so γ |Ei Ei α and γ E α.
Moreover, since for each i = 1,2, σi(Fi) is in Y (Fi) and Ei is a subcoalition of Fi, then σ(E) belongs to Y (E).
Now, the computation of ‖(t1x1 + t2x2) − (γ (E) − e(E) − σ(E))‖ shows that K is convex. 
Proposition 3.2. Assume that conditions (A.3) and (A.4) are satisﬁed. Then the set K is disjoint from IntL−.
Proof. Let us assume on the contrary that K ∩ IntL− = ∅. As a consequence, we ﬁnd z in K and ε > 0 such that, if
‖y + z‖ < ε, then y  0, y = 0.
On the other hand, since z is an element of K , we ﬁnd a coalition F in A \ N , an assignment γ in M(F ) and a
production plan y in Y (F ) such that
γ F α
and
∥∥z − (γ (F ) − e(F ) − y)∥∥< ε.
It follows that y − γ (F ) + e(F ) 0 and hence, by ﬁnite additivity of the production set correspondence and free disposal
assumption, γ (F ) − e(F ) ∈ Y (I) + Y (F c). Consider now the consumption allocation β deﬁned by β = γ |F + (α + e)|F c .
By ideal, selﬁsh and monotonicity properties β I α. Moreover, by ﬁnite additivity of production correspondence and free
disposal, β(I) − e(I) = γ (F ) + α(F c) + e(F c) − e(I) = γ (F ) − e(F ) + α(F c) ∈ Y (I) + Y (F c) − Y (F c) = Y (F ) + Y (F c) = Y (I),
contradicting the fact that α is in the core. 
Theorem 3.3. Assume that conditions (A.1)–(A.4) are satisﬁed. Then the core allocation α is a Walrasian allocation.
Proof. By feasibility of α, there exists a production allocation π such that
α(I) = e(I) + π(I).
Since K is convex and disjoint from IntL−, by ﬁnite-dimensional Separation theorem (see [1]), there exists a price system
p in L′+ such that p · K  0, that is, for each F in A \ N and γ assignment of F such that γ F α,
p · γ (F ) p · e(F ) + p · Y (F ). (1)
Moreover, since 0 ∈ Y (F )
p · γ (F ) p · e(F ). (2)
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By monotonicity, γε F α, for each F in A \ N and, since M(F ) is a convex cone, γε(F ) ∈ M(F ), for each F in A \ N .
In particular, γε(I) ∈ M(I) and γε I α. By deﬁnition of p, we get
p · γε(F ) p · e(F ) + p · Y (F )
and, in the limit,
p · α(F ) p · e(F ) + p · Y (F ).
It follows, by feasibility of α, that
p · α(F ) = p · e(F ) + p · π(F )
for each coalition F ∈ A \ N and, consequently,
p · π(F ) p · Y (F ).
The previous inequalities show conditions (i) and (ii) of Deﬁnition 2.11 and hence the fact that α is a quasi Walrasian
allocation.
It remains to prove that if there exist a non-null coalition F and an assignment γ ∈ M(F ) such that γ F α, then
p · (γ (F ) − e(F ))> p · π(F ).
We start observing that, by assumption (A.2), for each F in A \ N , p · e(F ) > 0. Hence, by (2), p · γ (F ) > 0, for each
allocation γ ∈ M(F ) such that γ F α. Moreover, by (1), p · (γ (F ) − e(F )) p · π(F ).
Assume, by contradiction, that p · (γ (F )− e(F )) = p ·π(F ). By Proposition 2.2, there exist a subcoalition E of F and ε in
(0,1) such that εγ E α. In particular, p · γ (E) > 0.
Deﬁne γ˜ = γ |F\E + εγ |E . By ideal, selﬁsh properties and superadditivity of the consumption set correspondence, γ˜ is an
assignment for F and γ˜ F α, so we get the contradiction
p · π(F ) p · γ˜ (F ) − p · e(F ) = p · γ (F \ E) + εp · γ (E) − p · e(F ) < p · γ (F ) − p · e(F ) = p · π(F )
that concludes the proof. 
Theorem 3.3 extends to coalitional model with consumption sets only contained in the positive cone the core equiva-
lence results proved in [4,7] (in the exchange case, notice that the production set correspondence deﬁned by Y (F ) = −L+
obviously satisﬁes (A.3) and (A.4)). The main technical ingredients to get price-supportability of a core allocation are the
(weak) Lyapunov convexity theorem on the range of a nonatomic f.a. vector measure and the ﬁnite-dimensional separation
theorem. Assumption (A.2) in addition to the continuity of preferences allows us to convert a quasi Walrasian equilib-
rium allocation in a Walrasian equilibrium allocation. This assumption can be replaced by irreducibility-type conditions. We
deﬁne the irreducibility property in the f.a. coalitional model starting from the classical one introduced in [16].
We say that the coalitional economy E is irreducible if the following property is satisﬁed:
(I) For every feasible allocation α, for every partition {F1, F2} of I with m(F1), m(F2) > 0, there exist an assignment γ in
M(F1), a production plan y ∈ Y (F1) and an assignment β ∈ M(F2) such that
(i) β F2 α,
(ii) e(F1) − γ (F1) + y + α(F2) = β(F2).
Lemma 3.4. Let E be an irreducible coalitional economy. Let α ∈ M be a feasible allocation, p a price system and π a production
allocation such that for each F in A \ N
(i) p · α(F ) p · e(F ) + p · π(F ),
(ii) p · π(F ) p · Y (F ),
(iii) if γ ∈ MF , γ F α, then
p · γ (F ) p · e(F ) + p · π(F ).
Then the set
T = {F ∈ A \ N : there exists γ ∈ MF , γ F α s.t. p · γ (F ) = p · e(F ) + π(F )}
is empty or coincides with A \ N .
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not belong to T . Otherwise, there would exist γ1 ∈ MF , γ2 ∈ MF c such that γ1 F α, γ2 F c α and




)= p · e(F c)+ p · π(F c)
that implies, by ideal property, I ∈ T . Assume now that I /∈ T , that T is non-empty and let F1 be a coalition in T . Denote by
F2 the coalition F c1. By deﬁnition of T , there exists γ1 ∈ MF1 , γ1 F1 α, such that
p · γ1(F1) = p · e(F1) + p · π(F1).
By irreducibility assumption, there exist γ in M(F1), a production plan y ∈ Y (F1) and an assignment β ∈ M(F2), β F2 α
such that
e(F1) − γ (F1) + y + α(F2) = β(F2).
Now observe that, since p · γ (F1) 0, using (iii) and the fact that F2 /∈ T , we can deduce
p · e(F2) + p · π(F2) < p · β(F2) = p · e(F1) − p · γ (F1) + p · y + p · α(F2)
 p · e(F1) + p · π(F1) + p · α(F2)
 p · e(F1) + p · π(F1) + p · e(F2) + p · π(F2)
and then
p · e(F1) + p · π(F1) > 0.
By continuity assumption, there exists a non-null coalition E ⊆ F1 and ε ∈ (0,1) such that εγ1 E α. Clearly, we have by (iii)
p · γ1(E) p · e(E) + p · π(E) 0.
Then
p · γ1(E) > p · e(E) + p · π(E)
or
p · γ1(E) = p · e(E) + p · π(E).
In the second case, the coalition E belongs to T and then, by the ﬁrst part of the proof, in both cases we would have
p · γ1(E) > 0.
So, exactly as in Theorem 3.3, we deﬁne γ˜ : (F1 ∩ A) → L+ by the law
γ˜ (·) = εγ1(· ∩ E) + γ1
(· ∩ (F1 \ E))
and we get γ˜ F1 α, γ˜ ∈ MF1 that imply
p · e(F1) + p · π(F1) p · γ˜ (F1) = εp · γ1(E) + p · γ1(F1 \ E) < p · γ1(F1) = p · e(F1) + p · π(F1).
This contradiction proves that T is empty.
Assume now that I belongs to T . There exists γ ∈ MI , γ I α such that
p · γ (I) = p · e(I) + p · π(I).
By (iii), for each non-null coalition F ,
p · γ (F ) p · e(F ) + p · π(F ).
If for a coalition F ,
p · γ (F ) > p · e(F ) + p · π(F )
we would have
p · γ (F c)< p · e(F c)+ p · π(F c)
and a contradiction. Then for each non-null coalition F ,
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and T = A \ N . 
The previous lemma shows that for irreducible coalitional economies, a quasi Walrasian allocation α is, actually, a Wal-
rasian allocation if we exclude the case when I belongs to T .
Let us denote by (I)′ the following condition:
(I)′ there exist F ∈ A \ N and β ∈ MF such that for each E ⊆ F there exists y(E) ∈ Y (E) with
β(E)  e(E) + y(E).
According to classical interpretations, the previous condition means that each subcoalition E of F can produce more of every
consumption good than is needed for the survival of its members. The next result shows that, under condition (I)′ , the case
I ∈ T is excluded.
Theorem3.5. Assume that the economy E is irreducible and that conditions (A.1), (A.3), (A.4) and (I)′ are satisﬁed. Then an allocation
α is a core allocation if and only if it is a competitive allocation.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we can show that there exists a non-negative price p such that for each F in A \ N
(i) p · α(F ) p · e(F ) + p · π(F ),
(ii) p · π(F ) p · Y (F ),
(iii) if γ ∈ MF , γ F α, then
p · γ (F ) p · e(F ) + p · π(F ).
Assume I ∈ T . There exists γ ∈ MI , γ I α such that
p · γ (I) = p · e(I) + p · π(I).
Consider the coalition F deﬁned by condition (I)′ . Let E be a non-null subcoalition of F such that εγ E α for ε ∈ (0,1).
Then by (I)′ and (iii),
p · γ (E) p · e(E) + p · π(E) p · e(E) + p · y(E) > 0
and exactly as in Lemma 3.4, we get a contradiction that excludes I ∈ T implying that T is empty. 
Remark 3.6. A close look at the proofs of the results in this section shows that the monotonicity assumption on coalitional
preferences (condition (m) introduced in Section 2) can be replaced, in the ﬁnite-dimensional setup, by the following weaker
assumption of local non-satiation
(lns) given F ∈ A \ N , α ∈ M(F ) and a neighborhood V of α (in the variation norm topology), there exists μ ∈ M(F ) ∩ V
such that μ F α
provided that a stronger free disposal requirement is assumed by means of the following condition
(A.3)′ for each coalition F ∈ A \ N , Y (F ) −L+ ⊆ Y (F ).
Indeed, the proof of Proposition 3.1 does not require monotonicity arguments at all and the statement of Proposition 3.2
follows also from (A.3)′ . Moreover, in the proof of Theorem 3.3 one obtains the inequality
p · α(F ) p · e(F ) + p · Y (F )
for each non-null coalition F , by means of a sequence of consumption allocations μn converging to α in the variation norm
topology and such that μn F α. On the other hand, the proofs of Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 3.5 do not require monotonicity.
We assume the monotonicity condition in the usual form (compare [4,7]) in order to treat under a uniﬁed approach the
ﬁnite-dimensional as well as the inﬁnite-dimensional framework (in the latter case, on the contrary, the strong monotonicity
requirement will be essential). Notice also that the weaker form of monotonicity assumed in the context of [11], being based
on endowment-uniform allocations, is excluded by our approach.
As a further technical remark, we notice that, along with the weaker local non-satiation assumption deﬁned above,
even the assumptions on the consumption sets correspondence can be weakened in order to convert a core allocation into
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correspondence M(F ), dispensing with the request of non-negativity of consumption allocations.
The assumption that M(F ) ⊆ L+ is used in the paper, in connection to monotonicity, to guarantee that allocations of the
form α + εe, for each ε, are preferred to α by each coalition. In the coalitional framework, it also embodies the idea that,
under a consumption allocation, each subcoalition of a coalition F receives less than F . In contrast, research in inﬁnitely
many commodities usually relies with stronger properties (like cone conditions on preferences) leading to assume that
individual consumption sets equal the non-negative cone. The case of general consumption sets (although still included in
the positive cone) in inﬁnite-dimensional economies is treated in [6], where the need for some restrictions on the structure
of consumption set is proved. The treatment of completely general consumption sets joint with the inﬁnite-dimensionality
and ﬁnite additivity that characterize our context seems to us to be very hard.
Remark 3.7. The free disposal assumption on the production sector is only used in this section in order to separate the
closed convex set K from the interior of the negative cone to obtain a supporting price system (Proposition 3.2).
This assumption can be removed when the consumption set of each coalition is assumed to coincide with L+ . Indeed,
the use of endowment-uniform allocations together with monotonicity assumption permits to prove, on one hand, that K
has non-empty interior, on the other that 0 /∈ int K (for the argument see [7, Proposition 3]).
The free disposal assumption can also be removed in the proof of Proposition 3.2 when consumption and production
allocations satisfy the strong Lyapunov convexity property (for example when the underlying measure m is assumed to be





μ(F ),μ ∈ M(F ),μ F α
}− e(F ) − Y (F )]
is convex and, since obviously 0 /∈ G , this is enough to ensure the existence of a supporting price p.
In spite of the cases presented above, we notice that, since we dispense simultaneously with both the use of endowment-
uniform allocations and with the Lyapunov convexity property, a removal of the arbitrage condition in the proof of
Proposition 3.2 would entail substantial stronger assumptions on the consumption set correspondence.
Remark 3.8. We now show that the (individualistic) equivalence result proved in [16, Theorem 1, p. 216] for a coalition
production economy can be deduced from our coalitional approach under a slight modiﬁcation of our basic assumptions.
Let (E i, Y ) be an individual coalition production economy as deﬁned in [16, Section 4]. To obtain a coalitional representation
E of the economy E i , deﬁne the consumption set M(F ) of a non-null coalition F as the integral over F of the individual
consumption set correspondence X(t). The initial allocation is deﬁned as the (c.a.) vector measure e(·) = ∫· e(t)dν . A con-
sumption allocation γ as γ (·) = ∫· g(t)dν , where g is an individual allocation. If γ (·) = ∫· g(t)dν and β(·) = ∫· b(t)dν are
two consumption allocations, and F is a non-null coalition, we deﬁne γ F β if and only if g(t) t b(t), for almost all
t ∈ F . The production set correspondence is exactly the same. It is easy to verify that the coalitional preferences satisfy
ideal, selﬁsh, continuity properties introduced in Section 2 and local non-satiation deﬁned in Remark 3.6 (this veriﬁcation
is standard and follows [13]). The consumption set correspondence is subadditive (actually additive) and with convex val-
ues. Moreover, by [5, Theorem 8.1], the production set correspondence is rich in c.a. ν-continuous selections. A coalitional
allocation γ (·) = ∫· g(t)dν is in the core of E if and only if the corresponding individual allocation g is in the core of E i . By
measurable selection theorem, we see also that γ is a (quasi) Walrasian allocation with a corresponding production alloca-
tion Π(·) if and only if g is a (quasi) Walrasian allocation with individual proﬁt distribution equal to the Radon–Nikodym
density π of Π . Hence, by Remarks 3.6 and 3.7, the assumptions on the economy E are enough to convert each individual
core allocation g in a coalitional quasi Walrasian allocation and to carry it back to an individual quasi Walrasian allocation
to get [16, Theorem 1, p. 216]. We notice also that, the coalitional quasi Walrasian allocation γ (·) = ∫· g(t)dν satisﬁes the
following additional property:
(iv) infγ∈M(F ) p · γ (F ) < p · e(F ) + p · Π(F ) and γ F α ⇒ p · γ (F ) > p · e(F ) + p · Π(F ).
Due to (iv), the statement of Proposition 3.4 is still valid (assuming a price system not necessarily in the positive cone) once
the set T is replaced by the following
T =
{
F ∈ A \ N
∣∣∣ inf
γ∈M(F ) p · γ (F ) = p · e(F ) + p · Π(F )
}
.
Hence the quasi Walrasian equilibrium γ can be converted in a Walrasian equilibrium under our irreducibility assumption
by standard arguments (compare [16]).
We notice ﬁnally that, in the converse direction, the construction of an individual representation of a coalitional count-
ably additive economy E is binded to the possibility of using uniform-endowment allocations (compare [13, proof of
Theorem 2]) and not only to the validity of the Radon–Nikodym theorem.
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Our aim in this section is to prove an exact decentralization result for core allocations when the commodity-price duality
is inﬁnite-dimensional.
The basic coalitional economic model presented in Section 2 will be modiﬁed as follows.
We start observing that, differently by the ﬁnite-dimensional framework, the existence of a probability measure m equiv-
alent to e is by no means obvious. For an inﬁnite-dimensional L, it means to require, equivalently, that the initial allocation
e : A → L+ is s-bounded (see [14]). We start discussing the equivalence between the core and the set of Walrasian alloca-
tions when the commodity space L is an ordered Banach space whose positive cone L+ has a non-empty norm interior.
The main assumptions and characteristics of the economic model remains unchanged.
Denote by Rα the range of a vector measure α.
We generalize the set M of allocations (Deﬁnition 2.1) according to the following axiomatic formulation (see [12,9]).
Deﬁnition 4.1. The set of allocations M is deﬁned as any convex cone of the space of all m-continuous f.a. vector measures
α : A → L+ which satisﬁes the following four properties:
1. e ∈ M;
2. xm ∈ M, for all x 0;
3. α ∈ M, F ∈ A ⇒ β = α|F ∈ M;
4. (α,β) ∈ M2 ⇒ Rα, Rβ, R(α,β) are relatively convex.
Notice that the axiomatic formulation of the space of allocations is extendable to the context of a Hausdorff locally con-
vex topological vector space (L, τ ), representing price systems as elements in the topological dual L′ of L (compare [12]).
Of course in this case the range of allocations will be assumed to be closed with respect to the topology τ and therefore
the weak Lyapunov convexity property contained in condition 4 will be satisﬁed with respect to any topology consistent
with the duality (L,L′).
Example 4.2. If we set M according to




for some f : I × Ω → L+ , f (·,ω) ∈ L1(m,L) and assume e ∈ M (for example we could start with e = xm for a given
vector x), then M is a set of allocations. This can be proved by joining a Stone space argument, as that of [7, Theorem 2],
to [14, Theorem 10, p. 266].
The ﬁrst version of the inﬁnite-dimensional equivalence is presented in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Assume that the positive cone of L has non-empty norm interior and that conditions (A.1)–(A.4) are satisﬁed. Then any
core allocation is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation.
Proof. Notice that, in view of the weak Lyapunov convexity property required for allocations, the proof of Proposition 3.1
remains unchanged. Moreover, the conclusions of Theorem 3.3 are still valid when we use one of the inﬁnite-dimensional
version of the separation theorems (see [1]). 
The previous theorem extends to commodity spaces whose positive cone have a non-empty norm interior the techniques
and analysis developed in Section 3. Unfortunately, most of the commodity spaces that are interesting in economic applica-
tions have a positive cone with an empty norm interior (see [1, Section 8.5]). In such case, consumption sets that are lower
bounded lacks interior points as well.
In the next result we present a version of the core-equivalence theorem in the ﬁnitely additive coalitional setting with-
out assuming that the positive cone has a non-empty interior or cone conditions on coalitional preferences. The strategy
proof relies on the adaptation to the ﬁnitely additive framework of a separation theorem due to Bishop an Phelps (see
for instance [17]): In spite of the fact that in inﬁnite-dimensional spaces not every boundary point of a non-empty closed
convex set K is a support point, it states that the set of support points of K is dense in the boundary of K .
It requires the following technical restriction on at least one of the production sets (see [19]).
We say that the coalitional economy satisﬁes the Khan–Vohra condition (shortly condition (K-V)) if
(K-V) there exists a non-null coalition Fo and po ∈ L′+ \ {0} such that any p ∈ L′ , ‖p‖ = 1, supporting Y (Fo) satisﬁes p  po .
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price duality, the ﬁnite additivity and the richness in f.a. selections of the consumption set correspondence will be exploited
to conclude. This will be possible due to the preliminary result proved in Proposition 3.1.
Theorem 4.4. Let E be a coalition production economy such that conditions (A.1)–(A.4) and (K-V) are satisﬁed. Then any core alloca-
tion is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation.
Proof. Denote by Fo the non-null coalition deﬁned by condition (K-V).





μ(F ),μ ∈ M(F ),μ F α
}− e(F ) − Y (F )]
}
is convex. By feasibility of α and monotonicity assumption, 0 is a boundary point of K . If K can be supported at point 0,
we have that for a suitable p ∈ L′ \ {0}, p · K  0. Then, free disposal and monotonicity assumptions ensure that p  0 and,
as in Theorem 3.3 we can conclude. If not, by the Bishop–Phelps theorem [17, p. 166], there exist, for any ε > 0, a vector
zε ∈ K , ‖zε‖ < ε and pε ∈ L′ \ {0} such that
pε · K  pε · zε.
Therefore
pε · K  pε ·
(
μ(Fε) − e(Fε) − y(Fε)
)
,
where Fε is a non-null coalition, μ ∈ M(Fε), μ Fε α, y(Fε) ∈ Y (Fε).
Deﬁne a new allocation β ∈ M(I) by means of β = μ|Fε + (α + e)|F cε . Then by ideal, selﬁsh and monotonicity properties,
β I α and
pε · K  pε ·
(
β(I) − e(I) − α(F cε)− y(Fε)).
The ﬁnite additivity of the production set correspondence and free disposal assumption ensure the existence of a production
plan y(I) ∈ Y (I) such that −α(F cε) − y(Fε) = −y(I) ∈ −Y (I). Let σ be a f.a. selection of Y such that y(I) = σ(I). Then the
previous inequality implies that
pε · K  pε ·
(
β(I) − e(I) − σ(I))
and, in particular,






pε · Y (Fo) pε · σ(Fo)
and, since we can assume that pε has unitary norm, by condition (K-V) we see that pε  po > 0. Let p be the limit of a
weakstar convergent subnet of pε . Then p = 0. Moreover, as ε tends to zero, zε tends to zero in norm. Therefore, p · K  0.
We can show by feasibility of allocation α, free disposal and monotonicity assumptions that the price p is positive and
conclude, as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, that α is competitive. 
Remark 4.5. It is worthwhile to observe that condition (K-V) allows us to dispense with additional cone conditions on
the consumption side and to deal with general ordered Banach spaces. The condition is interpreted in terms of “uniformly
bounded marginal rates of substitution” in [19], where it was introduced. It simply requires that the set of supporting
prices to a production set be bounded below by a non-zero positive price (in terms of the induced order). Consequently, in
the standard ﬁnite-dimensional case, it puts a (uniform) bound on the slope of the eﬃcient frontier in the production set
and therefore on the marginal rate of substitution tied to it. Differently by properness conditions, this bound is imposed
directly and not indirectly. Moreover, again in contrast with uniform properness, it does not require a lattice structure on
the commodity space.
Example 4.6. Observe that condition (K-V) does not imply that the production set Y (Fo) is supported at same point and
that it is obviously fulﬁlled for sets without any such points. Moreover, it does not imply interiority assumptions in the
general framework treated in our paper. As an example, consider in the Banach space of square summable sequences l2
the sequence f ≡ ( fn) with unitary norm deﬁned by f1 = 1, f i = 0 for each i = 1. Let F = {z ∈ l2 | f · z = 1} and observe
that a sequence z of l2 belongs to F if and only if z1 = 1. Deﬁne the production set Y as Y = l2− ∪ F . Then Y satisﬁes
assumption (A.3). It is easy to see that, due to the structure of sequences in F and since −l2+ does not contain interior
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Assume now that g is a unitary norm sequence in l2 supporting Y and let α be a real number such that g · z α, for each
z ∈ Y . Then g · (l2−)  α ensures that g  0 and α  0. Assume g1 > 0 and suppose that there is also a component gi of
g , i = 1, such that gi > 0. Then the sequence z ∈ F deﬁned by z1 = 1, zi = αgi , z j = 0, j = i is such that g · z = g1 + α > α
implying a contradiction. Then, g1 > 0 implies that gi = 0 for each i = 1 and, consequently, g = f . Now consider the case
g1 = 0. In this case, let gi > 0 and consider any δ > 0. Then the sequence z ∈ F deﬁned by z1 = 1, zi = α+δgi , z j = 0 for j = i
satisﬁes g · z = α + δ > α implying a contradiction too. Hence we conclude that Y can be supported only by the (unitary
norm) positive price f and therefore it satisﬁes condition (K-V).
Concerning this last example, notice that it is proved in [18] that the (K-V) condition implies that a closed, convex
production set with free disposal in Banach spaces has non-empty interior. This result is false for more general locally
convex spaces. The generality of our approach brings out that, in contrast to the second welfare theorem proved in [19], the
supportability result for inﬁnite-dimensional coalition production economies contained in Theorem 4.4 can also be evaluated
in the context of ordered Banach spaces.
Finally, observe that since condition (K-V) only involves the production sector, Theorem 4.4 does not imply the core
equivalence theorem in the case of pure exchange economies.
Remark 4.7. It is worthwhile to observe that the coalitional model generalizes the classical Aumann’s model of a nonatomic
economy in the ﬁnite-dimensional set up (see [4,13]). As a consequence, the equivalence proved in Theorem 3.3 produces
a corresponding core equivalence result in the individual framework. Going further, in the inﬁnite-dimensional setting the
capability of the coalitional model to produce results also for the individual model is binded to the separability of the com-
modity space. Indeed, it is exactly this assumption that allows to get core equivalence theorems in the case of nonatomic
individual economies with inﬁnitely many commodities (compare [21,23]). When L is assumed to be separable, a straightfor-
ward application of the measurable selection theorem shows that a price p supports an individual allocation as a Walrasian
equilibrium whenever it supports the corresponding coalitional allocation. Consequently, again the equivalence in the indi-
vidual setting can be derived from that in the coalitional one.
However, Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 show that, in the coalition production economy, contrary to the individualistic model, it
is not necessary to assume the separability of the commodity space (compare [9, Remark 4.1]).
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